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Abstract
We analyze a stylized model of co-evolution between any two purely competing species
(e.g., host and parasite), both sexually reproducing. Similarly to a recent model of Livnat et
al. [25] the fitness of an individual depends on whether the truth assignments on n variables
that reproduce through recombination satisfy a particular Boolean function. Whereas in the
original model a satisfying assignment always confers a small evolutionary advantage, in our
model the two species are in an evolutionary race with the parasite enjoying the advantage if
the value of its Boolean function matches its host, and the host wishing to mismatch its parasite.
Surprisingly, this model makes a simple and robust behavioral prediction. The typical system
behavior is periodic. These cycles stay bounded away from the boundary and thus, learning-
dynamics competition between sexual species can provide an explanation for genetic diversity.
This explanation is due solely to the natural selection process. No mutations, environmental
changes, etc., need be invoked.
The game played at the gene level may have many Nash equilibria with widely diverse fitness
levels. Nevertheless, sexual evolution leads to gene coordination that implements an optimal
strategy, i.e., an optimal population mixture, at the species level. Namely, the play of the many
“selfish genes” implements a time-averaged correlated equilibrium where the average fitness of
each species is exactly equal to its value in the two species zero-sum competition.
Our analysis combines tools from game theory, dynamical systems and Boolean functions to
establish a novel class of conservative dynamical systems.
Keywords: Hamiltonian, Lyapunov Function, Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem, Nash Equilib-
ria, Correlated Equilibria, Potential Game, Team Zero-Sum Game, Boolean Functions, Replicator
Dynamics, Multiplicative Weights Update.
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1 Introduction
An exciting recent line of work in the theory of computation has focused on the algorithmic
power of the evolutionary process (Valiant [48], Livnat et al. [25, 24]). The latter two papers iden-
tified as interesting the case of a sexually reproducing, haploidal, and panmictic (explained below)
species, evolving in a fixed environment according to variants of Multiplicative Weights Update
dynamics [11, 12]—which are typically referred to as “replicator dynamics” in the evolutionary
dynamics literature [50]. Curiously, however, Mehta et al. [27] made the discovery that these dy-
namics lead in the long run (in almost all cases) to a genetic monoculture. This rather contradicts
the evidence of natural diversity around us.
Several plausible explanations exist for this discrepancy, including: (a) mutations [28], (b)
speciation (e.g., the Bateson-Dobzhansky-Muller model) [19], (c) the mathematical assumptions
are too far from reality, (d) “in the long run” is longer than geologic time. There is, however,
a long-standing argument, that there is another (and perhaps more important) factor driving
diversity; to our knowledge this case was first compellingly laid out by Ehrlich and Raven in
1964 [15]: “It is apparent that reciprocal selective responses have been greatly underrated as
a factor in the origination of organic diversity.” (Already Darwin noted the significance of co-
evolution, e.g., between orchids and moths that feed on their nectar; but the proposed implication
for diversity seems to have come later.) In the ensuing decades this idea played a role in the Red
Queen Hypothesis [47] and was advanced as an explanation of an advantage of sexual over asexual
reproduction [6].
Apart from empirical study (e.g., [10, 46, 35, 8]), the dynamics of co-evolution have also been
studied mathematically, but primarily (explicitly or implicitly) for asexual reproduction—dynamics
in which the abundance of a genome changes over time in proportion to its fitness (possibly with
mutations), as in the work of Eigen, Schuster and others [16, 17, 32, 44, 45]. The case of sexual
reproduction, however, is quite different. There is a good mathematical model for these dynamics,
called the “weak selection” model [31], but effects of co-evolution are not yet understood in this
model.
We study a specific class of systems in this model, and provide a quantitative study of the
evolutionary dynamics of sexual species in highly competitive (“zero sum”) interactions. This
study supports the thesis of Ehrlich and Raven, that competition drives diversity, in a strong form:
not only does a genetic monoculture not take over, but in fact the entropy of the species’ genomes
is bounded away from 0 for all time. Thus we support a rationale for ecosystem diversity without
invoking mutation, speciation or environmental change.
A sexual species under weak evolutionary pressures (to be made precise) can be modeled, game-
theoretically, as a team, whose players are the genes [25, 12]. A team in a multiplayer game [26, 40] is
a set of players who share a common payoff but use independent randomness. In our setting we have
two teams that compete against each other for survival. Learning dynamics in such games create
dynamical systems entirely unlike those explored in the no-regret learning in games literature [9].
For example although there have been quite a few papers arguing about nonequilibrium limit cycles
in game dynamics [13, 21, 23, 34, 33], these typically explore small games with a maximum of two
or three players, each with two or three available strategies. Even in these settings the analysis is
typically intricate and is based on case-by-case observations that do not generalize to large classes of
games. In a handful of cases where non-equilibrium behavior is proven [37, 36, 30] in larger games,
the non-equilibrium behavior is typically non-periodic, and thus to a large extent unpredictable. In
contrast, we present a large parametric class of multi-agent games for which we prove periodicity
from almost all initial conditions.
1
Class of Games: We establish our results in the restrictive setting of “Boolean phenotypes”.
To explain, we will be studying a zero-sum competition between two species A and B. Organism
A has n genes, and organism B has m genes. Each is haploid (possessing, for each gene, exactly
one of the possible alleles), so that a genotype of species A is a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn), and that of
species B is σ = (σ1, . . . , σm). In the Boolean-phenotype model there are Boolean-valued functions
and a 2 × 2 payoff matrix U such that the result of an encounter between s and σ is a payoff
of U(f(s), g(σ)) (to A, and minus this to B).1 As compared with the full reach of evolutionary
dynamics this is a limited setting, but there are two good reasons to examine it.
1. This already constitutes an extension to two competing and adapting learners, of the study
of evolutionary learning of Boolean functions initiated in [25].
2. There are biological examples which approximately fit this assumption—not with respect to
the entire phenotype, but w.r.t. that aspect of the phenotype which is critical to the two-
species interaction. E.g., the length of a hummingbird’s beak vs. that of a flower; the size of
a crab’s pincers vs. the shell thickness of its prey; the choice of protein coatings employed by
a microbe, and the corresponding immune response.
Not every 2×2 game is, of course, zero sum; e.g., above, the interaction may be favorable to the
hummingbird and to the flowering plant. However, we are interested in the effects of competition,
and competition, in its purest form, is zero-sum. There is good reason, however, to view this zero-
sum interaction not as between two players but as between two teams, with the members of each
team being the genes of the species (a point of view influentially advocated by Dawkins [14]). The
fact that the genes are, as “agents”, pursuing their optimization independently of one another, is
crucial to the dynamics of sexual evolution.
Dynamics: The most tractable model of sexual evolution is to have the population at all times
be in a product distribution evolving according to the replicator equation. (The correspondence
between this continuous dynamic and the discrete-time MWU was described in [22, 27, 12]; MWU
is an ubiquitous meta-algorithm with numerous connections within the field of computer science [3].
In this paper we work directly in the replicator framework.) The replicator equation [42, 41], given
below in Eq. 1, is among the basic tools in mathematical ecology, genetics and the mathematical
theory of evolution. Replicator dynamics and MWU have been studied extensively in numerous
classes of games. For example, in the case of potential games where the utilities of all agents are
perfectly aligned, these learning processes are known to converge to Nash equilibria and in fact
generically to pure (non-randomized) Nash [22]. On the contrary in zero-sum games [39, 1, 37]
it is known that they can exhibit complex chaotic behavior, highly sensitive to initial conditions
(butterfly effect).
In our setting, an exceedingly rare form of structure manifests. We identify a novel class of
conservative systems, analogous to Hamiltonian dynamics (e.g. ideal pendulum). The conserved
quantity does not have a meaning of energy. This “constant of the motion” is a new type of
structure that has not been reported before that emerges from the combination of evolutionary
dynamics and Boolean logic (Lemma 9). Possession of a conserved quantity is no reason to expect
periodicity, as the dynamics are high dimensional.2 The orbits are shown to be periodic via a novel
1Like any multiplayer game, such team zero-sum games have Nash equilibria; but unlike the two-player zero-sum
game which they resemble, the team game generally has a positive duality gap. (See [40] where this is worked out,
and earlier [49] for the case of a team vs. a single player.) This gap creates an opportunity for very rich dynamics
when each gene continually adjusts its allele frequencies to the competition.
2m + n variables, minus 1 degree of freedom for the constant of the motion.
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type of embedding argument: Each orbit can be projected to a, possibly different, planar (and thus
periodic) conservative system without any loss of information. (Proposition 6 and Lemma 8).
Theorem 1: Given any two-team zero-sum game defined by two Boolean functions, so long as
all equilibria/fixed points are isolated, then all but a zero measure set of initial conditions lie on
periodic trajectories of the replicator dynamics. (Formal statement in Section 3, Theorem 11).
(a) XOR-XOR initial condition (0.65, 0.66, 0.3, 0.75) (b) OR-OR initial condition (0.8, 0.9, 0.3, 0.4)
Figure 1: Given generic initial conditions the system is periodic regardless of the pair of Boolean
functions defining it. The initial conditions, trajectories are of the form (x1(t), x2(t), y1(t), y2(t)).
An immediate corollary of our theorem is that since all monocultures are fixed points of the
dynamics, almost all initial conditions lie on trajectories that remain bounded away from the
monocultures. It is interesting to note that although the above theorem is robust to the choice of
the competing Boolean functions, e.g., XOR-XOR, AND-AND, AND-XOR, etc., the topology of
the periodic orbits is highly sensitive to the choice of these functions (see Figure 1).
Besides proving periodicity, we analyze this phenomenon from a game-theoretic/optimality lens
as well. We show that the time-average play over the strategy outcomes of the team zero-sum game
is a correlated equilibrium. Unlike zero-sum games, in team zero-sum games [40] (even Boolean
team zero-sum games) Nash equilibria may include outcomes of widely varying utilities for each
team (the notion of value no longer exists). Nevertheless, we show something extremely surprising
about these evolutionary dynamics on “selfish” genes: sexual evolution leads to gene coordination
that “solves” the zero-sum competition at the species level (see Figure 2). Thus, in three different
ways, sexual evolution implements an optimal strategy:
Theorem 2: Given any periodic orbit, the time average distribution of play over strategy
outcomes converges point-wise to a correlated equilibrium of the team zero-sum game.
Moreover, the time average Boolean output of each team converges to its unique Nash equilib-
rium strategy of the 2× 2 zero-sum game U . The time average expected utility of each agent
converges to the value of its team in the zero-sum game U . (Formal statement in Section 4,
Theorems 14 and 15).
Sexual evolution solves the game optimally at the level of the species, despite the fact that it
works on the level of the genes and that any signal coming from the species level interaction is
constantly getting scrambled due to genetic recombination.
Structure of the paper: Section 2 starts with an exposition of the model, formal definitions of
the game setting, as well as the learning dynamic. Section 3 contains the analysis of the periodicity
of the model and starts with a high level description of the proof structure. Section 4 develops
the connections to game theory, Nash and correlated equilibria and analyzes the time-average of
payoffs and system behavior. The paper ends with a discussion section (Section 5). The Appendix
contains a section on background material on topology and dynamical systems.
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(a) XOR-XOR initial condition (0.65, 0.66, 0.3, 0.75) (b) OR-OR initial condition (0.8, 0.9, 0.3, 0.4)
Figure 2: The time averages of the outputs of both teams (f, g) converge to the fully mixed NE
of the game (50%, 50%). The time average of the expected utility of the first team (and hence the
second as well) converges to the value of the game (which in this case is equal to 0.5).
2 Preliminaries
Notation: Vectors are in bold-face, and unless otherwise indicated are considered as column
vectors. The transpose of x is xT . The ith coordinate of x is xi. x−i is the vector derived by
removing xi from x. |S| is the cardinality of set S. ∆(S) is the probability simplex with support
set S, i.e., {(x1, x2, . . . x|S|) : xi ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑|S|
i=1 xi = 1}.
Zero-Sum Games among Species: We have two species, A and B. A’s genome has n genes,
and B’s has m genes. Both are haploids which means that each organism has one allele per
gene. (This is the simplest possibility. Humans are diploid, and other numbers are possible.) The
proportion of organisms of species A that have allele γ in their i-th gene is written xiγ . Similarly
for B the proportion of organisms that have allele δ in their j-th gene is yjδ. Clearly,
∑
γ xiγ = 1
and
∑
δ yjδ = 1 for any i or j. In this paper we focus on the simplified setting that each gene of
the host/parasite organism has two variants/alleles (i.e., allele 0 and 1). Thus, the genotype of an
organism in A (resp. B) is a Boolean vector of length n (resp. m) and we will abbreviate notation
by writing xi0 as xi. The vector (x, y) = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) expressing the composition of
alleles in each population of organisms can be thought of as encoding a randomized strategy for
each gene (the mixed strategy (xi, 1− xi) for gene i in species A).
A more important simplifying assumption is that each genotype produces one of only two
possible phenotypes (e.g., Rh blood factor +/−, long vs. short beak, etc.). A phenotype in our
context is simply an arbitrary boolean function on the genome; for s ∈ {0, 1}n we let f(s) ∈ {0, 1}
be the phenotype of organism A, and likewise g(σ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}m. The significance of this mapping
is that organisms interact only through their phenotype. The payoff for this interaction is given by
a utility (or fitness) function u(s,σ)=U(f(s),g(σ)), where U is a payoff matrix of dimension 2× 2.
When organisms s, σ interact, each gene in organism A receives the same utility u(s,σ) while each
gene in organism B receives the same utility −u(s,σ).
A natural example is as follows: A is a parasite and B is the host. If the outcomes of functions
f, g match, i.e., the “key” of the parasite matches the “lock” of the host, then the utility of the
host is −1 and the utility of the parasite is +1. Otherwise, the utilities are reversed. In this case,
matrix U is the Matching Pennies payoff matrix.
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u(s, σ) =
{
1, if f(s) = g(σ)
−1, otherwise. , or equivalently U =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
More generally, we allow for the zero-sum game defined by
U =
(
a b
c d
)
to be any 2×2 zero sum game that which has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is fully mixed. (i.e.,
either min(a, d) > max(b, c) or max(a, d) < min(b, c), or equivalently, the best response sequence
cycles (clockwise/anti-clockwise) along the four outcomes.) 3
Replicator Dynamics and Weak Selection in the Evolution of Sexual Species If p is
the distribution on genomes s of species A and q is the distribution on genomes σ of species B,
write us =
∑
σ q(σ)u(s, σ) (the fitness of genome s) and u =
∑
s p(s)us. The replicator dynamics
are that the rate of change of p(s) is p˙(s) = p(s)(us − u). A few lines of calculation show that the
resulting rate of change of xi (the fraction of the population having allele 0 in gene i) is
x˙i = xi(1− xi)
(
ui0 − ui1
)
and x˙i = 0 if xi ∈ {0, 1} (1)
where ui0 =
∑
s:si=0
p(s)us∑
s:si=0
p(s) =
∑
s:si=0
p(s)us
xi
being the fitness of allele 0 of gene i. Similarly for genes
of species B,
y˙j = −yj(1− yj)
(
uj0 − uj1
)
(2)
The work of Nagylaki in 1993 focused attention on study of these dynamics in the “weak
selection” model. In a sexual species, panmictic mating (mating of individuals selected uniformly
and independently) without selection pressures, leads over time to the genome distribution being
a product distribution, that is, to p(s) =
∏
i x
1−si
i (1 − xi)si . The weak selection model makes
the approximation that selection is slow enough relative to reproduction that the genome may be
considered at all times to be in a product distribution, with time-dependent marginals xi and yj .
The prior work [12, 25, 27, 29] is entirely within this model and it will be our focus as well. In
weak selection the equations 1, 2 may be considered a complete description of the process rather
than merely summary statistics.
What distinguishes our dynamics from prior work is that the fitness of a genotype is no longer
a constant but depends on the composition of the population of the other species; the fitness of
an allele of a particular gene depends on the compositions of both populations (except in that one
gene).
Genes↔Agents, Species↔Team of Agents, Allele↔Strategy. In terms of the analysis, it
will be helpful to think of the biological setting in purely game theoretic terms. The immediate
game theoretic analogue of this setting is to study competitions between two teams, A and B. The
first team has n agents, whereas the second has m. Each agent has two strategies, strategies 0 and
1 and we denote by xi
def
= xi0 the probability with which he chooses strategy 0. Given a strategy
outcome, all choices of agents in team A, (resp. B) are used as input in the Boolean functions of
each team f (resp. g) and each team participates with its respective output in the 2× 2 zero-sum
3Otherwise, (given any generic 2× 2 zero-sum game) this competition is trivial, since it can be solved via iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies and convergence to equilibrium for the whole system follows from standard
arguments. E.g., see [50]. Our analysis applies for all rescaled 2× 2 zero-sum that are not dominance solvable [20].
5
game U . All agents in a team enjoy exactly the same utility, i.e., their team’s utility in game U .
We denote by ui, ui0, ui1 respectively the expected utility of agent i, the expected utility of agent
i given that he chooses 0 and the expected utility of agent i given that he chooses 1 (where the
randomness is over the product distribution over the mixed strategies of all agents).
Existence and Uniqueness of Global Solution The theory of differential equations ensures
(for more details see, e.g., Chapter 6 of [50] or [2]) that replicator dynamics of a multi-player
game from initial conditions (i.e., initial probability distributions) z0, have a unique global solution
Φ(z0, ·) : R→
∏
i ∆(Si); furthermore that this solution is smooth as a function of time and initial
conditions. We define a trajectory or orbit through an initial state z0 as the image of the whole
time axis under the solution mapping Φ(z0, ·):
Traj(z0) = {z = Φ(z0, t) for some t ∈ R}
To ease notation, when keeping track of the initial condition is not critical, we write z(t) instead
of Φ(z0, t). We write x(t), (resp. y(t)) to denote the current (product) mixed strategy profile of
genes in species A (resp. B) or xi(t) (resp. yj(t)) to denote the mixed strategy of a specific gene.
3 Analysis
3.1 Overview of the Proof
A critical insight is that instead of tracking the true state of the system z(t) = (x(t),y(t)) =
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t), y1(t), . . . , ym(t)), and directly trying to argue about the system in its native state
space, we will focus on the quantities Es∼xf(s) and Eσ∼yg(σ), i.e., the expected output of the
Boolean functions of both teams of agents. We will denote these quantities as f, g.4 As it turns out,
it will be convenient to think of the distribution (f, 1−f) as encoding a mixed strategy implemented
in the 2× 2 zero-sum game U .
In Section 3.2, we identify and classify the equilibria (fixed points) of the dynamics. These
equilibria can be grouped into two categories. Nash fixed points are states in which the expected
output of each Boolean function (f, g) encodes the unique (fully mixed) Nash equilibrium of the
2×2 zero-sum game U . These are stationary due to the fact that no team can deviate and gain the
upper hand on its opposing team. The second type of fixed points, are states where at least one of
the two teams got “stuck”. Their opposing team (e.g., team B) is not (necessarily) implementing
its minimax strategy but nevertheless no agent of team A can influence the expected outcome
of his team’s Boolean function via unilateral deviations. One such example is when team A is
implementing a XOR function and at least two agents choose between 0, 1 uniformly at random.
We call these fixed points strange fixed points as they intuitively correspond to evolutionary
flukes, where changes to no single gene can affect the composition of the species.
In Section 3.3, we focus on a single population and show that the corresponding vector field
can be expressed as a product of a scalar “rate” term (that depends on the mixed strategy of
the opposing species) and a vector that only depends on the team’s own behavior (Proposition 2).
Thus, the trajectory that each team traverses depends only the Boolean function that it implements
(e.g., f) and its own initial condition (e.g., x1, x2, . . . , xn). Effectively, this trajectory corresponds
to replicator dynamics in a common utility/potential game where the joint utility of each agent in
any mixed strategy outcome is the expected output f of the team’s Boolean function.
4The expected output of the Boolean function of team A, f(x(t)), is clearly a function of x(t), however, sometimes
to simplify notation we will just write f(t) when we wish to focus on the time dependency, or just f .
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This connection to potential games becomes handy for several reasons. First, in Theorem 4,
we prove that strange fixed points are indeed evolutionary flukes that can be ruled out under
typical genericity conditions. Secondly, in Proposition 5, we can already establish that f, g exhibit
a natural “chasing” relationship, which is an early step towards proving periodicity. That is, if
we interpret the expected output of each organism as a mixed strategy with which the organism
participates in the zero-sum game then this mixed strategy will move in the direction that would
have increased its expected payoff given the mixed strategy of the opposing species. This creates a
“chasing” behavior with the directionality of the movement of each mixed strategy (i.e., increasing
or decreasing) flipping when the opposing team’s strategy transitions through the unique (mixed)
Nash equilibrium of the game.
Furthermore, in Section 3.4, we leverage the connections to potential games to formally prove
that it suffices to keep track only of the quantities f, g. As explained above, these quantities
correspond to the potential function in a common utility/potential game where the joint utility of
each agent in any mixed strategy outcome is the expected output of each team’s Boolean function.
In such a potential game, along any nontrivial trajectory the common utility/potential is strictly
increasing with time and thus given any initial condition x0 there exists a bijective function between
the time range over which the trajectory is defined, (−∞,∞), and the range of potential values
over this trajectory. Thus, given the initial condition of the team’s behavior and the current output
of the team, e.g., f(t), the current behavior of each member of the team xi(t) is uniquely defined.
In a sense, each trajectory can be embedded onto a two dimensional system since given the initial
conditions of both teams as long as we keep track of each team’s expected output f, g we can
uniquely identify the exact state of the system.
In order to prove the system periodicity we need to establish connections to the theory of
Hamiltonian systems. In Section 3.5 we show that the two dimensional system that couples f, g
together is effectively a conservative system that preserves an energy-like function. Specifically, up
to team specific reparametrizations and change of variables, the dynamical system has the form
{ df
dt = g
dg
dt = −f
}
⇔
{
df
dt =
∂H
∂g
dg
dt = −∂H∂f
}
which is a standard Hamiltonian system with Hamiltonian function equal to H = f
2+g2
2 . In this
parameterization all trajectories are cycles centered at 0. In our case, this conserved quantity,
or “constant of the motion”, is more elaborate; nevertheless, once we establish it exists, we can
leverage standard tools from topology of dynamical systems (Appendix C), and establish that its
orbits are periodic (Theorem 10). Putting everything in this section together, Theorem 1 (more
formally given as Theorem 11) follows.
Finally, in Section 4 we investigate the game-theoretic properties of these periodic orbits. By
periodicity, the time-averages of all involved quantities are well defined. In Theorem 14 we show
that the time-average play over the strategy outcomes of the team zero-sum game is a correlated
equilibrium of that game. Unlike zero-sum games, in team zero-sum games [40] (even Boolean team
zero-sum games) their sets of (Nash) equilibria may include outcomes of widely varying utilities
for each team. Nevertheless, in Theorem 2 (given more formally as 15), we establish that sexual
evolution leads to gene coordination at the species level, in a time-averaged sense. Namely, time
average of the output of each team (f, g) is equal to the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium
strategy of that team in the 2× 2 zero-sum game U . Furthermore, the average utility of each team
(and hence all of its members) is exactly equal to its value in the two species zero-sum competition.
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3.2 System Description & Fixed Points: The Nash, the Strange & the Partial
Lemma 1. There exists a constant α 6= 0 such that the replicator system equations reduce to:
x˙i = αxi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1)(g − q) for all agents i in team A,
y˙j = −αyj(1− yj)(gj0 − gj1)(f − p) for all agents j in team B
where (p, 1 − p), (q, 1 − q) the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium strategy in game U,−UT and
where fiγ = Es−i∼x−if(γ, s−i), gjγ = Eσ−j∼y−jg(γ,σ−j) for γ ∈ {0, 1}.
The proof of Lemma 1 deferred to Appendix A. This reparametrization does not affect the
shape of the trajectories. Hence, we assume wlog α to be equal to 1.
Structure of fixed points. Amongst all equilibria with full support, there exist two different
types of fixed points. The first type corresponds to outcomes where f = p and g = q, i.e., outcomes
in which the expected output of each Boolean function encodes the unique (fully mixed) Nash
equilibrium of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game. We call these Nash fixed points. The second type of
fixed points, we have either fi1 = fi0 for all agents i of team A, or gj1 = gj0 for all agents j of team
B, or both. We call these fixed points, strange fixed points.5 These are fixed points where at
least one of the two teams got “stuck”. Their opposing team (e.g., team B) is not (necessarily)
implementing its minimax strategy but nevertheless no agent of team A can influence the expected
outcome of his team’s Boolean function via unilateral deviations. One such example is when team A
is implementing a XOR function and at least two agents choose between 0, 1 uniformly at random.
Finally there exist fixed points in which some agents are using pure strategies (e.g., xi, yj = 0 or
1). We call these partial support fixed points. We can complete the categorization by defining
as partial support Nash fixed points, (resp. partial support strange fixed points) those partial support
fixed points with at least one randomizing agent such that when examining the subgame defined
by those strategies played with positive probability then they encode a Nash (resp. strange) fixed
point. Fixed points without any randomizing agents are called pure fixed points.
3.3 The Topology of the Trajectory of Team A is Independent of Team B
Proposition 2. The trajectory of team A {x ∈ [0, 1]n : (x, y) = Φ((x0,y0), t) for some t ∈ R} is
a subset of the trajectory of system
x˙i = xi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1) for all agents in team A,
with initial condition x0, which is independent of team B. We call this system, team’s A subsystem
and we denote its solution by ΦA(x, t). Moreover, f is a strict Lyapunov function in this system.
That is, given any initial condition x = x0 we have
df
dt
∣∣∣
x=x0
> 0, unless x0 is a fixed point of Φ
A.
Proof The multiplicative term (g− q) is common across all terms of the vector field corresponding
to agents in team A in lemma 1. Hence, it dictates the magnitude of the vector field (the speed of
the motion), but does not affect directionality other than moving backwards or forwards along the
same trajectory. Specifically, both systems x˙i = xi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1) for all agents in team A, and
5It may be the case that one fixed point satisfies the definition of both Nash fixed point as well as strange fixed
point. E.g. when both teams A,B implement the XOR function and play against each other in a Matching Pennies
game then the uniformly mixed strategy is both a Nash fixed point and a strange fixed point. This non-exclusivity
simplifies the exposition and thus we allow it.
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x˙i = −xi(1−xi)(fi0−fi1) for all agents in team A have exactly the same orbits (but traverse them
in opposite direction). So, the trajectory of team A in our original system corresponds to a subset
of a specific orbit of subsystem A. This specific orbit starts at the initial condition x0 (A-team’s
initial condition in the original system).
Moreover, we will show that f is a strict Lyapunov function for this projected system. Due to
the multilinearity of f on xi’s: f = xifi0 + (1 − xi)fi1 and therefore ∂f∂xi = fi0 − fi1. Combining
this with the definition of the vector field of subsystem A we have that
df
dt
=
∑
i
∂f
∂xi
x˙i =
∑
i
xi(1− xi)
(
fi0 − fi1
)2
The summation is clearly nonnegative and it is only equal to zero at the fixed points of ΦA.
Connection to potential games. Team’s A subsystem is equivalent to applying replicator
dynamics to a partnership game (a game where all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} agents receive the same pay-
off/utility at each (mixed) outcome) where the common utility function at mixed strategy x is
equal to f(x) = Es∼xf(s). A partnership game is a potential game with potential function equal
to the common utility. The potential is a strictly increasing function along any non-trivial system
trajectory and all initial conditions implying convergence to equilibria (see e.g., [22]). We will
leverage this connection and our current understanding of replicator dynamics in potential games
from [22] to argue that in system Φ only a measure zero set of initial conditions may converge to
strange fixed points.
Definition 3. We call an initial condition x0 of subsystem Φ
A safe, if and only if, the orbit
ΦA(x0, ·) does not converge to a non-pure6 fixed point for t→ ±∞. Analogous definitions apply for
subsystem ΦB as well. We call an initial condition (x0,y0) of system Φ safe, if and only if, both
x0 and y0 are safe in their respective subsystems.
By proposition 2, given a safe initial condition (x0,y0), its respective orbit Φ((x0,y0), ·) clearly
cannot converge to a partial strange fixed point for t → ±∞. Indeed, a necessary condition for
convergence to a partial strange fixed point in Φ given initial condition (x0,y0) as t→ ±∞ is that
either ΦA(x0, ·) or ΦB(y0, , ·) converge to a non-pure fixed point as t→ ±∞.
Theorem 4. If the fixed points of Φ are isolated then all but a measure 0 set of its initial conditions
are safe.
The proof of theorem 4 is deferred to appendix B. At this point we can show that the expected
outputs f, g of the two teams when viewed as mixed strategies (i.e., probability distributions)
(f, 1− f), (g, 1− g) in the 2× 2 zero-sum game are being updated in a “rational” way. Specifically,
when they are updated according to the system equations they will develop a “chasing” behavior
where each mixed strategy will move towards the direction that myopically increases its expected
payoff in the zero-sum game. This statement in itself does not suffice to argue periodicity as one
can easily create trajectories (not of our dynamics of course) that spiral towards the fully mixed
Nash equilibrium or diverge to the boundary while displaying this chasing behavior.
Proposition 5. Unless no agent of team A can influence the output of f via unilateral deviations,
the expected output of team’s A Boolean function, f , will increase (decrease) if and only if the
output g of team B is larger (smaller) than q (q = the probability of choosing the first action in
6non-pure = a fixed point with at least one randomizing agent.
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its unique Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game). Similarly, g will decrease (increase) when the
output f of team A is larger (smaller) than p (p = the probability of choosing the first action in its
unique Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game).
Proof Due to the multilinearity of f on xi’s: f = xifi1 + (1− xi)fi0 and therefore ∂f∂xi = fi1 − fi0.
Combining this with the vector field form presented in lemma 1 we have that
df
dt
=
∑
i
∂f
∂xi
x˙i = (g − q)
∑
i
xi(1− xi)
(
fi1 − fi0
)2
The summation is clearly nonnegative. In fact, it is only equal to zero at the fixed points of team’s
A subsystem.
From this point forward we will focus on safe initial conditions. This is a full measure set within
the set of all initial conditions. We will prove that any such state is periodic, i.e., it lies on a closed
orbit by establishing connections to planar Hamiltonian systems.
3.4 Reduction to 2-Dimensional Systems via Competing Lyapunov Functions
The next proposition states that knowledge of the initial condition as well as of the evolving
values of f, g suffices (in principle) to recover the complete system state at any time t.
Proposition 6. Given a safe initial condition z0 = (x0,y0), of system Φ as well that the values
f(t), g(t), there exist smooth functions Xx0i , Y
y0
j : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that xi(t) = Xx0i (f(t)) (resp.
yj(t) = Y
y0
j (g(t))) for all t ∈ R and for each agent i of team A (resp. for each agent j of team B).
Proof If x(t) (resp. y(t)) is time invariant, then the problem is trivial. Suppose not. We will
argue that given an initial condition for every agent i of team A, i.e., x0, its mixed strategy at
time t, as captured by xi(t) is uniquely defined given f(t). We know that the curve traced by
the agents of the first team x(t) is defined by their initial conditions and the function that they
implement. Specifically, it is contained in the trajectory of team’s A subsystem. So, as long as we
can uniquely pinpoint a state x on subsystem’s A trajectory ΦA(x0, ·), given x0 and f(t), then this
must correspond to team’s A state in the complete system Φ((x0,y0), ·). Moreover, in subsystem
A, dfdt > 0 unless we are at a fixed point. However, since x(t) is not time-invariant, x0 is not a fixed
point of subsystem A. Finally, by the uniqueness of the system solutions, we cannot reach a fixed
point in finite time, and hence dfdt > 0 for all times t ∈ R. So f as a function of time in subsystem A
is always increasing, and it is smooth since f(ΦA(x0, ·)) is a composition of smooth functions. Thus,
by the inverse function theorem (see Appendix C) f−1x0 exists
7, is smooth, and is strictly increasing.
Thus, it is bijective between its domain,
(
limt→−∞ f(ΦA(x0, t)), limt→+∞ f(ΦA(x0, t))
)
= 8(0, 1),
and R and given an input v = f(ΦA(x0, t)) in its domain f−1x0 returns t, the unique time instance at
which the Lyapunov function in subsystem A attains value v given initial condition x0. Thus, f
−1
x0 is
well defined given x0 alone. We define as Proji the projection function that given a vector returns
its i-th element, i.e., Proji(x) = xi. Putting everything together, X
x0
i
def
= Proji
(
ΦA
(
x0, f
−1
x0 (·)
))
indeeds recovers the accurate state of agent i in team A given the current value of f in system
Φ, i.e., f
(
Φ
(
(x0,y0), t
))
, since it lies in
(
limt→−∞ f(ΦA(x0, t)), limt→+∞ f(ΦA(x0, t))
)
= (0, 1).
Finally, we continuously extend Xx0i to [0, 1].
7The inverse function of f is effectively parametrized by x0 and that’s why we write f
−1
x0 .
8Since (x0,y0) is safe, in subsystem A the only possible asymptotes for f are 0 and 1.
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We return to the study of the two team system and argue about the periodicity of its orbits
(f(t), g(t)). Due to the existence of functions Xx0i , Y
y0
j , mapping (f(t), g(t)) to a unique (x(t),y(t))
the periodicity of (f(t), g(t)) extends to the system trajectories of Φ. To simplify notation will we
write from now on Xi, Yj instead of X
x0
i , Y
y0
j but the dependency on x0, y0 should be kept in
mind.
Definition 7. (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system: We define the following class of planar
dynamical systems on [0, 1]2 parametrized by a point (p, q) ∈ (0, 1)2 and two smooth functions r, w
defined on [0, 1] with r(0) = r(1) = w(0) = w(1) = 0 that are strictly positive in (0, 1). Given such
p, q, r, w we define a (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system as follows:
dξ
dt
= r(ξ)(ζ − q)
dζ
dt
= −w(ζ)(ξ − p)
The existence, uniqueness and smoothness of global solutions in the case of (p, q, r, w)-planar
dynamical systems follows from standard arguments, since the compact region [0, 1]2 is invariant
and the vector field is smooth. (see e.g., [2])
Lemma 8. Given a safe initial condition, (x0,y0) of Φ there exists a (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical
system such that if (ξ0, ζ0) =
(
f(x0), g(y0)
)
then (ξ(t), ζ(t)) =
(
f(x(t)), g(y(t))
)
for all t ∈ R.
Proof For our two team systems we have that
df
dt
=
∑
i
∂f
∂xi
x˙i = (g − q)
∑
i
xi(1− xi)
(
fi0 − fi1
)2
= (g − q)
∑
i
Xi
(
f(t)
)(
1−Xi
(
f(t)
))(
Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i)− Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r(f)
where r(f) =
∑
iXi
(
f(t)
)(
1 − Xi
(
f(t)
))(
Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i) − Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i)
)2
is a
smooth function and is clearly nonnegative since Xi
(
f(t)
) ∈ [0, 1]. If f(t) = 0, i.e., Es∼xf(s) = 0,
since x corresponds to a product distribution and f is a Boolean function we have that for each
i either xi = 0 or xi = 1, or the value of f over all outcomes in the support of x are equal to
0. Hence, Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i) = Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i) = 0. Thus, in all cases if f(t) = 0
then r(f) =
∑
iXi
(
f(t)
)(
1−Xi
(
f(t)
))(
Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i)−Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i)
)2
= 0. A
similar argument can be applied if f(t) = 1. Finally, we will argue that since x0 is safe then r(f)
is strictly positive for f ∈ (0, 1). It suffices to show that for any f(t) ∈ (0, 1), ∑iXi(f(t))(1 −
Xi
(
f(t)
))(
Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i) − Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i)
)2
> 0. Since f(t) ∈ (0, 1) there must
exist some randomizing agents in distribution x. Amongst these agents, there must exist an agent
i, Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(0, s−i)− Es−i∼X−i(f(t))f(1, s−i) 6= 0, since otherwise the state where each agent
i of team A plays Xi(f(t)) would be a non-pure fixed point of subsystem A contradicting the
assumption that the initial condition (x0,y0) is safe. The argument for g, i.e., team B follows
along the same lines as for team A.
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3.5 Constants of Motion, Hamiltonian Systems, and Periodicity
Finally, we establish that the two dimensional system that couples f, g together is effectively
a conservative system that preserves an energy-like function. It is easy to check that if in the
definition of our (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system we set the functions r, w being everywhere
equal to 1 then after a change of variables f = ζ− q, g = ξ− p, the dynamical system has the form:
df
dt = g =
∂H
∂g ,
dg
dt = −f = −∂H∂f , which is a prototypical Hamiltonian system with Hamiltonian
function equal to H = f
2+g2
2 . All of its trajectories are cycles centered at 0.
The conserved quantity, i.e., the “constant of the motion”, in our case is described in the
following lemma and leveraging it we will establish that the system trajectories are periodic.
Lemma 9. The quantity
H(ξ, ζ) =
∫ ξ
p
z − p
r(z)
dz +
∫ ζ
q
z − q
w(z)
dz
is a constant of the motion (first integral) of the (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system, i.e., it is
time-invariant given any initial condition.
Proof By applying the chain rule on dH(ξ,ζ)dt we have:
d
( ∫ ξ
p
z−p
r(z)
dz
)
dt +
d
( ∫ ζ
q
z−q
w(z)
dz
)
dt =
ξ−p
r(ξ)
∂ξ
∂t +
ζ−q
w(ζ)
dζ
∂t = (ξ − p)(ζ − q)− (ζ − q)(ξ − p) = 0.
Theorem 10. Every safe initial condition (x0,y0) lies on a periodic orbit of Φ.
Proof From lemma 8 the system corresponds to a (p, q, r, w)- planar system. If (x0,y0) is a Nash
fixed point of Φ then it is trivially a periodic point. Suppose (x0,y0) is not a Nash fixed point,
then either f 6= p or g 6= q (or both). In all cases H(f(x0), g(y0)) > 0 and due to lemma 9 the
trajectory of the planar system stays bounded away from its unique interior equilibrium (p, q), since
H(p, q) = 0. Moreover, the gradient of H at (ξ, ζ) is equal to ( ξ−pr(ξ) ,
ζ−q
w(ζ)) and thus we can create a
trapping/invariant region C = {(x, y) : 0 < α < H(x,y) < β} ⊂ (0, 1)2 \ (p, q). By the Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem and since the trapping (invariant) regions does not contain any fixed points the
α, ω-limit set of the trajectory is a periodic orbit. Since the gradient of H is only equal to 0 at (p, q),
H
(
f(x0), g(y0)
)
is a regular value of H. By the regular value theorem H−1
(
H
(
f(x0), g(y0)
))
is a
manifold of dimension 1. The union of the trajectory starting at (x0,y0), along with its α, ω−limit
sets, is a closed, connected 1-manifold and thus it is isomorphic to S1 (see Appendix C).
At this point, we are ready to piece together all our structural characterizations of the system
trajectories to derive our first main theorem:
Theorem 11. Given any two-team zero-sum game defined by two Boolean functions, so long as
all equilibria/fixed points are isolated, then all but a zero measure set of initial conditions lie on
periodic trajectories of the replicator dynamics
Proof By theorem 4 since all the system equilibria are isolated, then all but a measure zero set
of initial conditions are safe. By lemma 8 and 10, the projection of these trajectories on the space
of outputs of each of the two teams, i.e. on the space (f, g) is periodic. Finally, by 6 given a safe
initial condition z0 = (x0,y0), of system Φ as well that the values f(t), g(t), there exist smooth
functions Xx0i , Y
y0
j : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that xi(t) = Xx0i (f(t)) (resp. yj(t) = Y
y0
j (g(t))) for all
t ∈ R and for each agent i of team A (resp. for each agent j of team B), thus the periodicity of
f(t), g(t) translates to a periodic orbit on the space of system behaviors, i.e. on (x(t),y(t)) and
the proof is complete.
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4 Time Averages, Connections to Equilibria and Utility
Next, we will show that the time-average of the periodic trajectories of replicator dynamics
satisfies some interesting game theoretic properties. In order to discuss these properties, it is useful
to provide a reminder on some of the most basic solution concepts in game theory.
We give the definition of a correlated equilibrium, from [5].
Definition 12. A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a distribution pi over the set of action profiles
S =
∏
i Si such that for all player i and strategies si, s
′
i ∈ Si, si 6= s′i,∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(si, s−i)pi(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(s
′
i, s−i)pi(si, s−i)
We will also make use of the coarse correlated equilibrium ([51]), which is exactly the set of dis-
tribution that no-regret algorithms converge to. This convergence is only set-wise, i.e., distance of
the time average behavior of no-regret dynamics and the set of CCE converges to zero, however,
the time-average play may never converge to a specific CCE.
Definition 13. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is a distribution pi over the set of action
profiles S =
∏
i Si such that for all player i and strategy si ∈ Si,∑
s∈S
ui(s)pi(s) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(si, s−i)pii(s−i)
where pii(s−i) =
∑
si∈Si pi(si, s−i) is the marginal distribution of pi with respect to i.
First, we will show that the time-average distribution over the space of strategy outcomes over
any periodic orbit is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, the time-average of the output
of each team f, g corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium of the 2× 2 zero-sum game. Finally,
the expected utilities of all agents correspond to the value of each of their respective teams in
their zero-sum game. In effect, the sexual replicator dynamics enable the agents of each team to
collaborate with each other so as to optimally solve the zero-sum game against the opposing team.
Figure 2 shows specific examples of periodic trajectories where time-averaging over them converges
to the solution of a Matching Pennies game9 between two teams.
Theorem 14. Given any periodic orbit, the time average distribution of play over strategy out-
comes converges point-wise to a specific correlated equilibrium.
Proof The time average of play is well defined and converges to a unique distribution over the
space of strategy outcomes. Since the trajectory is periodic and the interior of the state space
is invariant, the trajectory stays bounded away from the boundary of the state space. However,
in this case the time average of the trajectory of the replicator converges to a coarse correlated
equilibrium. More specifically, we will show that if any individual agent deviates to any fixed
strategy then the time average of his expected utility does not decrease.10 The replicator equation
x˙i = xi(1 − xi)
(
ui0 − ui1
)
is equivalent to x˙i = xi
(
ui0 − uˆi
)
as well as x˙i = −(1 − xi)
(
ui1 − uˆi
)
,
where uˆi = xiui0 + (1 − xi)ui1, i.e., the expected utility of agent i when taking into account his
randomized action as well.
9This is a rescaled Matching Pennies game where all utilities are nonnegative and the value of the game is 0.5.
10Interestingly, we will show that it does not decrease either. The time average any agent’s expected utility remains
invariant given any deviation to a fixed strategy.
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Next, we will isolate the probability related terms xi on the LHS and all the utility related
terms on the RHS and we will integrate over a time interval [0, T ] and divide by T . I.e.,∫ T
0
1
xi
x˙idt
T
=
∫ T
0
(
ui0 − uˆi
)
dt
T
(3)
∫ T
0 − 11−xi x˙idt
T
=
∫ T
0
(
ui1 − uˆi
)
dt
T
(4)
However, by a simple change of variables we have that
∫ T
0
1
xi
x˙idt = ln[xi(T )] − ln[xi(0)],∫ T
0 − 11−xi x˙idt = − ln[1 − xi(T )] + ln[1 − xi(0)]. The LHS of equations 3, 4 converge to zero as
T →∞. Moreover, since the trajectories are periodic (e.g., with period TP ), all the following limits
exist limt→∞
∫ T
0 ui0dt
T =
∫ TP
0 ui0dt
TP
, limt→∞
∫ T
0 ui1dt
T =
∫ TP
0 ui1dt
TP
, limt→∞
∫ T
0 uˆidt
T =
∫ TP
0 uˆidt
TP
. Thus, for
any agent i:
∫ TP
0 uˆidt
TP
=
∫ TP
0 ui0dt
TP
=
∫ TP
0 ui1dt
TP
and since no agent can improve their time average
utility over a single period by deviating to any fixed strategy, then, by definition, the time average
distribution of play over a single period is a coarse correlated equilibrium of the team zero-sum
game.
Moreover, since in this game any agent has exactly two available strategies any coarse correlated
equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium. This is true, as the only extra allowable deviation that
needs to be checked11 is the one where he flips his strategy, i.e., whenever he played strategy 1
he now deviates to strategy 0, whereas whenever he played 0 he deviates to 1. However, we know
that each of these deviations cannot improve the agent’s expected utility (by the coarse correlated
equilibrium property), so the combined deviation does not improve his expected utility either.
Theorem 15. Given any periodic orbit12 the time average output
∫ T
0 f(t)dt,
∫ T
0 g(t)dt of each team
converges to the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium of the team game, i.e. p, q respectively. More-
over, the time average expected utility of each agent converges to the value of his team in the 2× 2
zero-sum game U .
Proof By lemma 8, we have that the outputs f, g satisfy a (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system:
df
dt
= r(f)(g − q)
dg
dt
= −w(g)(f − p)
Since f, g are strictly positive along the periodic orbit,13 we can isolate f, g on different parts
of the equation, and then we integrate over a time interval [0, T ] and divide by T .
∫ T
0
1
r(f)
df
dtdt
T
=
∫ T
0 (g − q)dt
T
(5)∫ T
0
1
w(g)
dg
dt dt
T
= −
∫ T
0 (f − p)dt
T
(6)
11Checked in terms of whether it can improve the agent’s expected utility.
12We implicitly assume that this corresponds to a generic, safe initial condition.
13Since it lies in the interior of [0, 1]2 and by the definition of our (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical systems.
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However, by a simple change of variables we have that
∫ T
0
1
r(f)
df
dtdt =
∫ T
0
d
dt(
∫
1
r(f)df)dt =∫ f(T )
f(0)
1
r(f)df . Similarly,
∫ T
0
1
w(g)
dg
dt dt =
∫ g(T )
g(0)
1
w(g)dg. Hence, limT→∞
∫ T
0
1
r(f)
df
dt
dt
T = limT→∞
∫ f(T )
f(0)
1
r(f)
df
T =
0. Similarly, limT→∞
∫ T
0
1
w(g)
dg
dt
dt
T = 0. Therefore, limT→∞
∫ T
0 gdt
T =
∫ TP
0 gdt
TP
= q and similarly,
limT→∞
∫ T
0 fdt
T =
∫ TP
0 fdt
TP
= p.
Next, we will proceed with the argument about the time average of the agents’ utility. Let
~f =
(
f
1− f
)
and ~g =
(
g
1− g
)
then the expected utility all agents in team A is equal to ~fTU~g.
Let ~p =
(
p
1− p
)
and ~q =
(
q
1− q
)
then (~f − ~p)TU(~g − ~q) = ~fTU~g − ~pTU~q, since ~p, ~q are fully
mixed Nash equilibrium strategies of the 2× 2 zero-sum game. So, we have that:
1
T
∫ T
0
(~f − ~p)TU(~g − ~q)dt = 1
T
∫ T
0
~fTU~gdt− 1
T
∫ T
0
~pTU~qdt =
1
T
∫ T
0
~fTU~gdt− ~pTU~q
Therefore in order to argue that 1T
∫ T
0
~fTU~gdt = ~pTU~q, i.e., that the time average of agents’
utility is equal to the value of their respective team in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U , it suffices to
show that limT→∞ 1T
∫ T
0 (
~f − ~p)TU(~g − ~q)dt = 0. The payoff matrix U is as follows:
U =
(
a b
c d
)
We have that (~f − ~p)TU(~g − ~q) = (a − b − c + d)(f − p)(g − q). Therefore it suffices to show
that
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
(f − p)(g − q)dt = 0.
By equation 5, we have already argued that limT→∞ 1T
∫ T
0 (g− q)dt = 0, thus finally we have to
show that limT→∞ 1T
∫ T
0 f(g−q)dt = 0. Reworking the equations of the (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical
system:
f
r(f)
df
dt
= f(g − q)⇒
∫ T
0
f
r(f)
df
dtdt
T
=
∫ T
0 f(g − q)dt
T
⇒
∫ f(T )
f(0)
f
r(f)df
T
=
∫ T
0 f(g − q)dt
T
.
However,
∫ f(T )
f(0)
f
r(f)df is bounded and hence limT→∞
∫ f(T )
f(0)
f
r(f)
df
T = 0, implying limT→∞
∫ T
0 f(g−q)dt
T =
0, and the proof is complete.
5 Discussion
We have identified a novel class of conservative dynamical systems that arise from the simu-
taneous application of learning dynamics by many (independently acting) agents, provided those
agents partition into two teams, with aligned interests within each team and opposed interests
across the teams. These learning dynamics are precisely those widely studied recently in learn-
ing theory; they are also those studied in the evolutionary theory of sexually reproducing species
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(“species”=“team of genes”). Beyond having a conserved quantity, these high-dimensional dynam-
ical systems have several properties, each of which was surprising: (a) The dynamics are periodic
for almost all initial conditions. (b) The dynamics of the agents not only minimize regret (con-
verge to coarse correlated equilibria) but furthermore the time average of any trajectory converges
point-wise to a correlated equilibrium that is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. (c) The time
average play of these trajectories are shown to implement the minmax strategies of each species in
its struggle for survival against the opposing species. (d) The time average utility of each agent,
under these dynamics, is actually the same as if each team was cooperating to play its best strategy
at every moment in time—despite the fact that the agents are not cooperating (the distribution of
play by a team is always a product distribution across agents), and that their play is not constant
in time nor converging to a constant in time.
Each of these properties is, to our knowledge, without precedent in high dimensional dynamics
of learning / sexual evolution. Cyclic trajectories are known to exist in low dimensional game
theoretic systems, systems of species competition or even hypercycle equations, but no such result
is known for larger systems [20]. Conversely, there exist many simple low dimensional examples
where replicator dynamics can have complex trajectories [38].
The results of this paper are obtained entirely in an infinite-population, continuous-time limit.
Finite-population, discrete-time models have a number of defects, not least of which are that they
have too many adjustable parameters, and that rounding and drift terms turn conserved quantities
into “almost conserved” quantities. Having said this, the issue cannot be ignored, as there are
known situations in which finite-population models have qualitatively different behavior than their
corresponding infinite-population model [4]. In our situation, the periodicity theorem actually
guarantees that the dynamics of the system keep every allele frequency bounded away from 0 and
1; in the short run this precludes irreversible rounding errors that occur when such a frequency
is rounded to 0 or 1. Of course, roundings by 1/population must occur, so in the long run, such
rounding may accumulate until the dynamics are very far from the infinite-limit cycle, and then,
eventually, roundings to 0 or 1 can occur. For moderate time scales we do not expect this to affect
the predictions of the paper. (For long time scales one must keep in mind that our theorems depend
also on other idealizations of the model, notably the weak selection hypothesis and the absence of
other effects such as mutations or selective mating patterns.)
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof By assumption the 2×2 zero sum game has a unique Nash equilibrium with p = d−ca−b−c+d , q =
d−b
a−b−c+d . By substitution in equation 1 we derive:
x˙i = xi(1− xi)
(
ui0 − ui1
)
= xi(1− xi)(fi0(ga+ (1− g)b) + (1− fi0)(gc+ (1− g)d)−
− fi1(ga+ (1− g)b)− (1− fi1)(gc+ (1− g)d))
= xi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1)
(
g(a− b− c+ d)− (d− b))
= (a− b− c+ d)xi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1)
(
g − d− b
a− b− c+ d
)
= αxi(1− xi)(fi0 − fi1)(g − q)
where α = (a−b−c+d) 6= 0 by assumption. By substitution in equation 2 we derive the analogous
system for team B.
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B Proof of Theorem 4
The high level idea is that by definition, if x0 and y0 are safe for subsystems Φ
A and ΦB re-
spectively then (x0,y0) is safe for system Φ as well. However, subsystems Φ
A,ΦB correspond to
replicator dynamics being applied to a potential game. By applying a game theoretic characteriza-
tion of stable equilibria in potential games for replicator dynamics developed in [22] we can show
that replicator dynamics does not converge to such randomized states for all but a zero measure of
initial conditions in each subsystem. Thus, all but a measure 0 set of initial conditions are safe in
Φ as well.
We will start the formal proof by providing the relevant definitions and theorems from [22].
Definition 16 ([22]). A Nash equilibrium is called weakly stable if each agent i remains indif-
ferent between the strategies in the support of his (mixed) strategy xi whenever any other single
player j modifies his mixed strategy to any pure strategy in the support of his (mixed) strategy xj.
Theorem 17 ([22]). For all initial conditions replicator dynamics converges to equilibria in poten-
tial games. If a fixed point that is not a Nash equilibrium, the set of initial conditions converging
to is of zero measure. If a fixed point is not a weakly stable Nash equilibrium, the set of initial
conditions converging to is of zero measure.
Lemma 18. If x is an isolated, not pure, fixed point of subsystem A, i.e., with at least one ran-
domizing agent i such that fi0 = fi1 = f , then it cannot be a weakly stable Nash equilibrium in the
partnership/potential game where all agents receive in each outcome utility equal to the output of
their Boolean function f(x). A symmetric statement holds for y, isolated, not pure, fixed point of
subsystem B.
Proof We will prove the contrapositive. If an equilibrium is weakly stable that means by definition
16 that given any single deviation of a randomizing agent i to a pure strategy no other randomizing
agent can deviate and improve his/her payoff. However, this means that in both outcomes (0,x−i),
(1,x−i) (for which fi0 = fi1 = f by the fixed point property) no randomizing agent can deviate
and increase his/her payoff. This implies that fi0i′0 = fi0i′1 = fi0 = f for any randomizing agent i
′
in x (of team A). Similarly, that fi1i′0 = fi1i′1 = fi1 = f for any randomizing agent i
′ in team A.
Hence the outcomes (0,x−i), (1,x−i) are fixed points of subsystem A. Moreover, as long as exactly
two (randomizing) agents, fix their behavior then the expected output of the Boolean function does
not change. We will show that any product distribution (δ,x−i) where 0 < δ < 1 is also a fixed
point. It suffices to check all the (randomizing) agents other than i. If this set is empty we are
done. Otherwise, let i′ be such an agent. Any such agent when deviating to a pure strategy receives
utility equal to the expected output of team’s A Boolean function. For example if he deviates to
his first strategy then he receives fiδi′0 = δfi0i′0 + (1− δ)fi1i′0 = f . Hence, (δ,x−i) is a fixed point
as well for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and the initial fixed point x is not isolated.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof By definition, if x0 and y0 are safe for subsystems Φ
A and ΦB respectively then (x0,y0) is
safe for system Φ as well. However, subsystems ΦA,ΦB correspond to replicator dynamics being
applied to a potential game. By lemma 18 we have that an isolated, not pure, fixed point of
subsystem A or B, cannot be a weakly stable Nash equilibrium in the partnership/potential game
where all agents receive in each outcome utility equal to the output of their Boolean function f(x).
By applying Theorem 17 the set of initial conditions that converge to any such equilibrium as
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t→∞ is a measure zero set. By applying Theorem 17 on the cost minimization potential game14
where at any outcome x agents have to pay cost equal to the output of their Boolean function f(x),
we derive that the set of initial conditions that converge in subsystem A to any such equilibrium
as t → −∞ is still a measure zero set. Finally, by assumption all system equilibria are isolated
and thus there can only be finitely many of them.15 So, by taking union bound over all not pure,
isolated fixed points we have that the set of all initial conditions converging to them as t→ ±∞ in
each subsystem is a zero measure set. Since the state space Φ is the product of the state spaces of
ΦA,ΦB, the set of all such conditions (x0,y0) such that either x0 or y0 are not safe is a measure
zero set of the state space of Φ.
C Background on Topology, Manifolds, and Dynamics
Definition 19. Let U ⊂ Rn and V ⊂ Rk be open sets. A mapping f from U to V written as
f : U → V is a smooth map if all of the partial derivatives exist and are continuous.
More generally we have the following:
Definition 20. Let X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rk be arbitrary subsets, and a map f : X → Y is called
smooth map if for every x ∈ X there exist an open set O ⊂ Rn with x ∈ O and a smooth mapping
F : O → Rk that coincides with f throughout O ∩X.
A 1-manifold (or manifold of dimension 1) is a topological space which is second countable (i.e.,
its topological structure has a countable base), satisfies the Hausdorff axiom (i.e., any two different
points have disjoint neighborhoods) and each point of which has a neighborhood homeomorphic
either to the real line R or to the half-line R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}.
Theorem 21 ([18]). Any connected closed 1-manifold is homeomorphic to S1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2 :
x2 + y2 = 1}.
Definition 22. Let U, V be manifolds. A map f : U → V is called a diffeomorphism if f carries
U onto V and also both f and f−1 are smooth.
Definition 23. Let f : U → V be a smooth map between same dimensional manifolds. We denote
that x ∈ U is a regular point if the derivative is nonsingular. y ∈ V is called a regular value if
f−1(y) contains only regular points. If the derivative is singular, then x is called a critical point.
We also say y ∈ V is a critical value if y is not a regular value.
For a smooth function on Rn to R, a point p is critical if all of the partial derivatives of the
function are zero at p, or, equivalently, if its gradient is zero. Given a differentiable map f from
Rm into Rn, the critical points of f are the points of Rm, where the rank of the Jacobian matrix
of f is not maximal.
14A fully mixed fixed point (or more generally a fixed point where for each agent i his expected utility remains
constant when unilaterally deviating to any other strategy) is a Nash equilibrium in both the payoff maximization and
the cost minimization game, i.e., it does not matter if you receive or pay f(x) and in both games for the same reasons
it is not a weakly mixed Nash. On the other hand, if there exists an agent i such that when unilaterally deviating
to another strategy his payoff decreases then in the cost game this fixed point is no longer a Nash equilibrium and
Theorem 17 still implies a zero measure of initial conditions converging to it.
15Otherwise, given any countable set of equilibria by compactness of the state space there will be a concentration
point in this sequence, which leads to a contradiction since every fixed point is isolated.
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Theorem 24 (Sard’s Theorem). Let f : X → Y be a smooth map of manifolds, and let C be
the set of critical points of f in X. Then f(C) has measure zero in Y .
Theorem 25 (Regular Value Theorem). If y ∈ Y is a regular value of f : X → Y then f−1(y)
is a manifold of dimension n−m, since dim(X) = n and dim(Y ) = m.
Theorem 26 (Inverse Function Theorem). Let U, V be open sets of Rn. If f : U → V is a
smooth map and at a point p the jacobian matrix dfp is invertible, then there is a neighborhood U
of p on which f : U → f(U) is a diffeomorphism.
For functions of a single variable, the theorem states that if f is a smooth function with nonzero
derivative at the point p, then f is invertible in a neighborhood of p, the inverse is smooth, and(
f−1
)′
(f(p)) = 1f ′(p) , where the left side notation refers to the derivative of the inverse function
evaluated at f(p).
Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem
The Poincare´-Bendixson theorem is a powerful theorem that implies that two-dimensional sys-
tems cannot exhibit chaos. Effectively, the limit behavior is either going to be an equilibrium, a
periodic orbit, or a closed loop, punctuated by one (or more) fixed points. Formally, we have:
Theorem 27 ([7, 43]). Given a differentiable real dynamical system defined on an open subset of
the plane, then every non-empty compact ω-limit set of an orbit, which contains only finitely many
fixed points, is either a fixed point, a periodic orbit, or a connected set composed of a finite number
of fixed points together with homoclinic and heteroclinic orbits connecting these.
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